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Vietnam - the term used for the Republic of Vietnam unless
otherwise stated - is a developing country with a population
of about 18 million people, expanded over an area of 169
thousand square kilometers. The traditional agriculture is
its main economic activity which employed more than 80 per
cent of the population and gave an annual per capita income
of not more than U.S. $100 each head.
Shortly receiving freedom in the mid-1950 1 s, after an
almost-a-century struggle against foreign rulers, the country
has been immersed again in another war. Though much ink has
been spilled and a peace agreement was signed years ago, the
substance of this war has remained debated and it is seem-
ingly an endless war. One thing which could be sure is that
this war has swallowed a large part of the resources, both
human and material, and the energies necessary for building
the country, on the one hand. However, on the other, in
contrast of other wars, the current Vietnam war created many
strange patterns for the economy of this country.
In order to help the Vietnamese government against the
communist expansion, the United States had injected billions
of U.S. dollars into Vietnam to support its military, which
included more than half of a million combat troops in the
peak of war. It also contributed substancial AID counterpart
funds. As dollars, this money made possible, and indeed

encouraged, massive commercial imports; as piasters/ it
covered most of the government's budget deficit.
In that context, the Vietnamese economy, even in the
wartime, still had the prosperous appearance, which was
clearly showed by imported goods overflowing on markets.
In the final years of the American involvement, there
existed an inverse trend. The rapid cutback in U.S. expendi-
ture in Vietnam, along with the foreign troop withdrawals,
has destroyed the previous economic prosperity. The gap in
the country's budget could not be bridged and thus, inflation
became more and mroe spiral. Meanwhile, the unemployment,
mainly caused by the shutdown of U.S. military bases and
offices in the country, became a matter to be discussed for
the first time in years! In addition, the nation's foreign
exchange reserves reduced sharply, due to the foreign trade
deficit, in which exports could only finance 2 per cent of
imports
.
The dummy appearance was immediately replaced by the
true face of a deteriorated economy which heavily depended
upon the external resources.
In such conditions, the war in Vietnam was described as
to be changed from military battles to economic ones. In
other words, the Vietnamese government has been in front of
many major economic problems , in which one concerning to
this paper is the foreign trade deficit.
Even though the foreign trade was totally out of balance,
it?s seemingly very difficult to reduce imports sharply. Tt
10

was strongly believed that one of the finest weapons to
defend the free world against the communist is the higher
standard of living in the former. In Vietnam, although it
may be wrong, that standard was formed mostly by imported
commodities. Therefore, any sharp reduction in imports will
create disadvantages on the government credit. Moreover,
the most important part of national revenue came from the
import tax duties. It implied that the budget deficit will
be greater if imports are going down. In addition, a great
part of the population got used to the foreign goods consump-
tion and they cannot leave it easily 1
Bounded by those constraints, the Vietnamese government
has accepted that export promotion is the only viable way to
solve the foreign trade deficit problem, along with gradually
reducing imports, particularly luxury ones! Moreover,
through the view point of Vietnamese planners, export promo-
tion is also considered as a feasible way to survive the
economy! In other words, exports could play the role as
"the engine of growth" to develop the economy. With these
implications , export promotion was viewed as a national plan
with highest priority.
This paper concentrates on the exports activities of
Vietnam. Its main purpose is to present the country's export
performance in the past, and to estimate its prospects in the
future. In doing so, some lines briefly covering the foreign
trade policy of developing countries were needed in comparing
to the nev/ Vietnamese export policy.
11

Needless to say, because of their close relationship,
exports could not be considered separately from other
economic activities, particularly from imports. However,
due to many restrictions, this paper does not pay too much
attention on those, even if it should do.
12

II. FOREIGN TRADE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIFS
During the past two decades or three, a "fundamental
revolt" has been sweeping the foreign trade theory, bringing
profound changes in the economic pattern developed in almost
four centuries since the first direct commercial contact
between Europe and the overseas world. The revolt in trade
theory, in fact, represents one facet of the greatest politi-
cal fact of the present time - the revolt of the under-
developed economies, the former colonial countries, against
the political and economic system which had resulted from
their commercial and political contacts with the advanced
countries. The essence of this revolt has reflected on the
following, J. Nehru's statement:
We talk of freedom but today political freedom doesn't
take us very far, unless there is economic freedom.
In fact, there is no such thing for a man who is starving
or for a country which is poor. The poor, whether they
are countries or individuals, have little place in the
world. 1
Economic development, therefore, became the ultimate
goal of the developing countries and, from the start, it was
an intensely political matter, a business for the governments,
In that context, the role of exports was reviewed.
Endowed with an abundance of labor, as v/ell as natural
resources in some cases, the developing countries have been
dealing with an important question: whether their external
trade will generate a major force for attaining a satisfac-
tory rate of economic development in their countries.
13

Trade-growth relationship, therefore, has become a contin-
ually disputed problem! As other economic debates, the
classical theory was preferred by some, while others used
historical experiences to strengthen their arguments.
A. DEVELOPMENT THROUGH TRADE: THE CLASSICAL THEORY
Trade-growth relationship was presented in the classical
theory as an optimistic one. Trade was considered to be not
simply a device for achieving productive efficiency but also
an "engine of growth." The gains from trade in the economic
development process can be simply explained as follows. When
a country specializes according to its comparative advantage
and trades at the international exchange ratio, it gains an
increase in real income. In other words, in a more scholarly
term, it means that the "production possibility curve" is
expanding from the origin.
This mechanism was very clearly described by the classical
economists. John Stuart Mill, for instance, in his "Principal
of Political Economy," stated that the gains from trade,
through comparative advantage, comprised not only the "direct
economical advantage" which is a "more efficient employment
of the productive forces," but also the "indirect effects
2
which must be counted as benefits of a high order." These
indirect benefits, according to Mill, include the improvement
of the production process by a larger market, more extended
division of labor, greater use of machinery, as well as the
existence of a new motivation which stimulates the people to
work harder, to accumulate more capital, to break the chain
14

of habit and turn the population toward new wants, new
tastes, new ambition, and greater thought for the future.
In brief, foreign trade not only helps a poor country to
remove domestic shortages and to overcome the diseconomies
of the small size of its domestic market, but also provides
"a sort of industrial revolution," which improves the tech-
nology of production to get a higher productivity and creates
an appropriate and favorable environment for economic develop-
ment. For these several reasons, the traditional conclusion
has been that international trade stimulates a country's
development
.
This classical conception of the impact of trade is empha-
sized again by some recent economists. G. Haberler, for
example, after reconsidering the benefits of foreign trade on
the economic development in the modern context which accounted
for such factors as the international movement of capital,
the antimonopoly policy, healthy degree of free competition,
etc. . ., concluded that "international trade has made a
tremendous contribution to the development of less developed
countries in the 19 and 20 centuries and can be expected
3
to make an equally big contribution in the future."
In order to prove that foreign trade did have a propul-
sive role in economic development, many historical cases have
been cited. In the case of Britain, development was fostered
by the export trade in woolen manufacture and cotton textiles;
for Sweden, it was the timber trade; for Denmark, dairy





In many cases of successful development, the importance
of the international trade is cearly "confirmed , not only for
countries that exported industrial products , but also for
primary product exporters.
The foregoing analysis, however, indicates only what could
be - not necessarily what has been or is! Indeed, the histor-
ical experiences of numerous poor countries reveals consider-
able growth in their foreign trade, but only a slow rate of
domestic development. Fxports usually played a lagging role,
instead of a leading one.
B. CRITICS OF THE CLASSICAL THEORY
As cited above, after World War II, developing countries
reviewed their trade performance and many studies were carried
out, based on historical data. Their results show that from
192 8 to 1955, the volume of exports from both industrial and
primary-producing countries rose by nearly 40 per cent, but
if petroleum is excluded, the rise in exports from the later
5group was under 2 per cent. Further evidence of the slower
rate of the growth of exports from the primary producers than
from the industrial countries is shown by the fall in the
percentage share of the former in the world exports . If the
oil countries are included, the percentage fell only margin-
ally from 34 in 1957; but excluding the oil countries, the
fall was from 32 to 24 per cent over the period.
In a smaller scale, the foreign trade performance of the
developing Asian region gave a relevant example. According




this region's share in the world export is rather small and
shows a tendency to decline; thus, from 10.1 per cent in
1928 it fell to 9.6 per cent in 1938, then to 8.2 in 1948,
7
and in 1960 it was only 6 per cent. Moreover, it is
apparent that after a poor country became part of the
international economy, its production did increase, but
primarily for exports. Despite this increase in exports,




Based on those facts, critics of the traditional view
on the growth-trade relationship then can be classified into
two types: first, the arguments on the lagging role that
international trade has impeded those countries' development.
1. Critics of the Exports' Role
The arguments invoked can be conveniently grouped
according to whether they place emphasis on a deficiency of
world demand for the exports of primary producing countries,
or on a deficiency in the supply of these commodities.
a. Demand Deficiency
Perhaps, Ragnar Nurkse was the most powerful
advocate of the "demand deficiency theory." According to
Nurkse, the demand expansion for primary products helped
economic growth in the 19th century. However, in recent
periods, "there is a relative lag in the industrial countries'
9demand for a wide range of primary commodities. The causes
of this relative lag appear to have been:
17

— Change in the industrial structure in favor of "heavy"
industries with a low content of imported raw materials,
— rising share of services in the total output of
advanced countries
,
— low income - elasticity of consumer demand for agri-
cultural products,
— agricultural protectionism in advanced countries,
— introduction of synthetic materials which substitute
the imported natural materials.
Nurkse did not, however, deny that in some countries, domes-
tic policies have resulted in restrictions on supplies of
primary produce for export but he considered that "such
policies can sometimes be interpreted as reactions to rela-




In contrast to that view, the failure of primary
producing countries to expand their exports was interpreted
as the deficiency in their own capacity to increase the supply
of these products.
The sharpest argument in general supporting this
view has been expressed by A. K. Cairncross. He pointed out
that the failure of those countries to expand their exports
of primary products in proportion to their economic growth,
or to their consumption of manufactures, is caused by the
price factor. The prices of exports from developing countries
have, in fact, risen since prewar by half as much again as
18

the prices obtained by industrial countries for their exports
of primary produce. In his point of view, Cairncross stated
that the increasing price "reflected the acute pressure on
supplies of primary produce in a full-employed economy - a
pressure that continued because of the low elasticity of
supply of this produce."
Many reasons are cited as the causes of this "low-
elasticity of supply." Some of the most important include:
— the concentration of effort in many developing coun-
tries on industrialization rather than agricultural
development
,
— their inability to transform resources from one sector
to the others
,
— the existence of intermediate goods that are needed in
relatively fixed proportions in many productive pro-
cesses and that the less developed countries cannot
produce for themselves.
In addition to these two extreme views , there
existed some "neutral" ones. Professor Kindleberger , for
instance, believed that the problem of export expansion in
developing countries had been caused by both the "internal
conditions" - the supply side - and the "external conditions"
- the demand.
Staffan B. Linder put it in a more scholarly way,
"in developing countries it may not, in fact, be possible to
solve the factor-proportions problem through trade"; the
reason for this was "the existence of an export maximum,"
based on the inelasticity of the foreign offer curve for
19

primary products and their inability at an early stage of
13growth to produce and market finished manufactures.
On the other side, ECAFE countries, after accept-
ing that there actually existed some internal obstacles, have
claimed that exports from the region were confronting various
kinds of obstacles created by developed countries, among
which Western Europe was the most important. The quantita-
tive import restrictions, tariffs and preferences policies,
internal fiscal charges, agricultural policy, etc., were
listed as the main measures to protect the domestic market
against exports from developing countries, especially from
the ECAFE region. These obstacles, the region concluded,
"have indicated decisively that export expansion along
14traditional lines is limited,"
2 . Critics of the Exports' Performance
The second type of critic is sometimes presented in
an angry and bitter tune. The free play of international
market forces, in the view of some economists, "will tend
cumulatively to accentuate international inequalities," and
"a quite normal result of unhampered trade between two
countries, of which one is industrial and the other under-
developed, is the initiation of a cumulative process towards
the impoverishment and stagnation of the latter," as argued
15by Myrdal.
The arguments supporting this idea, first of all,
come from the analyses of unfavorable effects of international
factor movements. These movements have been claimed to
20

create a highly unbalanced structure of production in develop-
ing countries. In order to keep the natural resources supply
in a proper level, inflow of capital has developed only the
export sector and neglect the production in the domestic
sector. The result is simply the creation of a "dual econ-
omy" in which production is "export biased," and the export
sector is separated and surrounded by a backward- low-
productivity sector. The former is usually composed of plan-
tations, mines, oil fields, etc., which produce for export,
in large-scale and capital-intensive manufacturing. To the
contrary, the latter is dominated by peasant agriculture,
handicrafts, small-scale and labor-intensive industry produc-
ing for local demand.
The advanced industrial sector received capital,
especially capital from foreign countries, to produce exports
and expansion in exports may have induced investment and
stimulated technological progress in this sector. However,
the rate of investment in this sector and labor employment
opportunities did not keep pace with population growth. The
result is that the increasing population had to seek employ-
ment in the backward "pre-industrial" sector: disguised
unemployment, therefore, became inevitable in this sector
whenever all available land was cultivated. In other words,
developing countries were still in a condition of poverty and
could not "take off" even though exports did increase.
The most ardent argument, however, may be the so-called
"Prebisch's thesis." This vrork , following the name of a
21

well-known Argentine economist, Raul Prebisch, stated that
underdeveloped countries have actually been hurt by inter-
17
national trade. In his famous essay, Dr. Prebisch stressed
that economies in developed countries (the Center, according
to Prebisch) are self-sustained through technological progress,
whereas developing countries (the Periphery, in the author's
terminology) play the role of raw material suppliers for the
former. The problem resides on the fact that "general
improvements in productivity tend to be fully reflected in
the increment of the wage rate at the Center, while at the
Periphery a part of the fruits of these improvements is
transferred through the fall of export prices and the corres-
18ponding deterioration in the terms of trade."
In other words, the commercial interchange between
peripheral and central countries based on the exports of
primary and industrial goods, respectively, is of a sort
which does not facilitate economic development in the
Periphery: the poor communities remain trapped inside a
vicious circle of low productivity and low savings, followed
by more of the same. In the light of Prebisch 's thesis, the
Adam Smith's "international division of labor" theory which
is the basis for the classical theory of international trade
19is likely invalid.
In addition to the above arguments, it has also
become common to claim that the international operation of
the "demonstration effect," created by trade, has been a
20handicap for the poor countries. This effect has raised
22

the propensity to consume in the poor countries and has
thereby limited capital accumulation. The consequences, how-
ever, are only sufficiently strong and detrimental for such
poor countries whose imports are mostly composed of second
products and there exists a large urban population.
C. THE MIXTURE OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MATTERS
Even though, based on the statistical data, the relative
deterioration of the developing countries' foreign trade is
an undeniable fact, the critics against the traditional theory
of trade-growth relationship mentioned above seem to be
ambiguous and blended by more political implications than
economic ones.
The critical interpretation of the export-biased inter-
national factor movements cited above has, in fact, neglected
to take into account many other important factors. First,
since foreign trade has accounted for a large share of
governmental revenue, the governments of many poor countries
have actually pursued policies designed to attract foreign
investment to their export sectors in order to promote their
export trade. As will be mentioned later, more or less,
this is the case of Vietnam through the new export policy!
Secondly, foreign investment, regardless of its character,
has not been competitive with home investment. There is no
reason to believe that if there had not been foreign invest-
ment, a poor country would have generated more domestic
investment; or that, in the absence of foreign entrepreneurs,
the supply of domestic entrepreneurs would have been larger.
23

In other words, the real choice in many underdeveloped
countries was not so much between using the resources for
export production or for domestic production, as between
giving employment to the surplus resources in export produc-
21txon or leaving them idle. Therefore, as Nurkse stressed,
"even 'unbalanced' and unsteady growth through foreign trade
22
was surely much better than no growth at all."
The second major criticism of international forces, the
so-called Prebisch's thesis, has, in fact, relied on extreme-
ly weak statistical foundations and its analytical reasoning
is unconvincing. Many studies have shown that the allegation
of a long run decline of the terms of trade of primary pro-
23ducers or of underdeveloped countries is vague. In addi-
tion, even if the terms of trade had deteriorated, the basic
difficulty would have been not the external change in prices,
but the failure to have had sufficient internal resource
flexibility. If domestic resources were mobile, the distri-
bution of resources would tend to shift from export sector
to home market industries when the commodity terms of trade
deteriorate. In other words, by inducing shifts in produc-
tion and in the distribution of resources, a change in the
, - 24terms of trade would tend to reverse or counteract itself.
At this point, it is more likely that, instead of focusing
on the unfavorable effects of international trade, the
domestic economy of the poor country may be a more convincing
explanation for its trade-growth problem.
24

Factor immobility, price rigidity, restrictive tendencies
in both the factor and good markets, ignorance of techno-
logical possibilities, limited knowledge of market conditions,
poorly articulated price system are some of the numerous
inhibiting factors existing in the domestic economies of
underdeveloped countries.
In connection with these domestic impediments , the tra-
ditional structure of the society as well as the economical
inefficacy of the governments in formulating and administer-
ing economic policies have been the socio-cultural and
institutional obstacles for economic development in those
countries
.
These impediments have had bad effects on the transmis-
sion of the gains from exports to other sectors. Then even
a strong stimulus from foreign trade will have only slight
penetrative power.
In summary, in Ros tow's terms, the failure of the export
sector to have been a primary growth sector, setting in
motion expansionary forces elsewhere in the economy, may be
attributed in large part to the absence of the preconditions
necessary for a take-off into self-sustained growth. While
their exports rose, many poor countries at the same time had
not yet experienced the second stage of growth - a transi-
tional era when the politics, social structure, and values




D. EXPORT INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
It is likely that the debate of the trade-growth relation-
ship could last indefinitely. However, whatever the causes
have been, the bad effects of export lagging as well as
export fluctuation on the economic growth of developing
countries are undeniable.
The vital goal of these countries, as noted, is economic
development and their plans are mostly based on the amount
of capital goods and intermediaire goods imported to push the
productivity. These imports, in turn, depend upon the foreign
exchange mostly earned by exports. When exports increase
less rapidly than national product, it can hardly be expected
that they will earn sufficient foreign -exchange for financing
economic development and provide a satisfactory market for
the growth of domestic production, thus fulfilling the function
of generating momentum for economic growth. Moreover, when
exports increase at slower rate than imports and enlarge the
trade deficits, the economic grov/th process is bound to be
frustrated by balance of payments difficulties, unless
foreign aid is forthcoming in sufficient amounts to fill the
gap.
The case of ECAFE countries may be helpful to prove this.
The considerable export lag has put a serious brake on
the economic development of the region, particularly on
the foreign exchange earning on which the region's bulk
supply of capital goods depends . . . the large export
surplus of 1928 was reduced by more than one half by
1938 and was replaced by a sizable import surplus in
1948 ... in the post war period . . . the region's
deficit leaped from U.S. $.4 billion in 1948 to the level
of about 1.3 billion in 1959-61. 26
26

Furthermore, not only does the lag in exports hamper the
rate of economic growth, the export instability is also detri-
mental to economic development in the less developed coun-
27tries. This instability is usually caused by fluctuations
in the export prices as well as the export volume of primary
products. During the period of 1901 to 1950, the year to
year price changes over 18 primary commodities which represent
the major exports of 47 underdeveloped countries, averaged
about 14 per cent; fluctuations within the year averaged
about 27 per cent as between the high and the low point of
28
each year. The changes of export volume showed up as even
larger than the price changes, averaged between 18 and 19
29per cent on a year to year basis.
In general, these fluctuations may come from the indus-
trial import market or potentially from the traditional
structure of the underdeveloped production conditions. Their
effects, however, are the same in adding to the complexities
of the economic planning and management, and adversely affect-
ing the process of economic development. On the one hand,
the capacity to import investment goods vital for economic
growth is destabilized; on the other, there are the hurtful
effects on the growth of exports.
Moreover, as Myrdal pointed out,
From the point of view of the need .to import capital goods
for economic development, it should also be noted that a
large part, usually more than a half, of the export pro-
ceeds are needed for the import of essential consumer
goods. In a downward movement, this usually results, of
course, in the cutting down of imports of capital goods




It is also worth noting that many of the developing
countries rely almost exclusively on the export proceeds of
one or two commodities. This lack of diversification natur-
ally tends to increase the fluctuations of their total export
earning.
In short, while export trade is of critical importance
to the economic development of less developed countries, its
recent performance has been disquieting. The considerable
lag in these countries' exports behind those of the developed
countries, as well as its fluctuations, lead to a widening of
the already large gap between standards of living in the
developed countries of the world and in the developing ones.
E. NEW TRADE POLICIES OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Dealing with these disadvantages, underdeveloped coun-
tries have to trace out a new road to follow. This road
must simultaneously fulfill their two ambitions: political
independence and economic growth.
To many of them, this promising road is the industrial-
ization. As described by Prebisch,
Although it is not an end in itself, (industrialization is)
the principal means at the disposal of the countries for
obtaining a share of the benefits of technological progress
and of progressively raising the standard of living of the
masses . 32
In their techniques, the first phase of industrialization
is usually based on the home market in the form of import-
substitution. Generally, import substitution in any plan
does not aim at a reduction of total imports, but at a
saving of foreign exchange in order to allow for import of
28

capital goods or certain basic consumption goods which can
not be adequately produced at home in the near future.
The motives of this policy can, in fact, be described by
facts other than the aim at economic independence and self-
sufficiency. Newly developing domestic production may be
used to substitute for imports or add to exports merely as a
result of general profit seeking ventures. Import substitu-
tion may be an incidental result of import restrictions or
equivalent policies adopted as stop-gap measures to limit an
acute short term balance of payment deficit. Even if the
government does not intend to promote domestic production,
import restriction, or the increase of import cost, may pro-
vide enough profit incentive to produce the restricted
articles at home.
Even import substitution may theoretically arise in these
different contexts , the result is usually leading to indus-
trialize the economy.
It has been pointed out that industrialization through
import substitution does more than increase income and
33foreign exchange saving. The establishment of certain
industries adds to existing external economies and paves the
way for many new lines of productive activities. These
industries increase the demand for material and equipment
and may furnish byproducts for further processing. They
promote the growth of technical skills among the workers and
management alike so that they seek new opportunities for
innovation. If well-nourished and supported with adequate
29

training and infra-structure, these import-substituting and
export industries may carry the seeds for general economic
growth.
In brief, although some measures have to be applied in
carrying this policy, such as import limitations, import
quotas, foreign exchange controls, etc., the above mentioned
advantages have strengthened the role of import substitution
to be the best policy in view of most developing countries
in the recent time.
There have existed other additional policies which attri-
bute to import substitution. As mentioned above, since most
of these countries concentrate on one or two main commodities
,
all come to the world market with much too narrow a range of
goods for exporting. Needless to say, they arc easily hurt
when the prices of those goods fluctuate. Diversification of
exports then is the urgent need for most underdeveloped
countries. This helps them to be safe in the price fluctua-
tion, on the one hand, and to strengthen their bargaining
power, on the other. Moreover,
This is the only practical means of overcoming the basic
weakness of underdeveloped countries in international
trade, which is rigidity, and of acquiring the flexibility
in their economy which is a precondition for greater
success in exploiting the new opportunities and releasing
themselves from the less remunerative lines of exports. '"
Along with diversification of exports, cooperation among
developing countries has been suggested for supporting indus-
trialization. The small size of most underdeveloped coun-
tries prevents them from going ahead in the industrialization
process. In order to reach the full advantages of economies
30

of scale and specialization/ the policy of regionally eco-
nomic integration has been promoted among these countries.
The case of Latin America is evidence:
Trade between Latin American countries forms only 10 per
cent of Iheir total foreign trade, and industrial exports
are relatively very small by contrast with countries such
as Italy, Japan, and others with similar income levels.
All this has resulted in the splitting of the industrial-
ization process into as many watertight compartments as
there are countries , without the advantages of special-
ization and the economies of scale,
and the best solution for this is
the enlargement of national markets through the establish-
ment of a common market,
35
as stressed by Prebisch.
The developing countries in the ECAFE region had the same
idea. They believed that development activities, in strict
context of import substitution, "had tended to the national
autarkic. This has inevitably led to duplication of efforts
and to difficulties in expanding markets beyond national
boundary, resulting in inefficient production and waste of
36
resources." The view point of those countries is clearly
stated: "An import substitution program on a regional scale
would be more sensible and mutually beneficial than merely
37import-substitution within individual national boundaries."
In addition to the economic policies mentioned above,
some internationally political actions were also advocated
by developing countries in order to accentuate their ambition,
It is likely that the "complaint" of the developing countries
on the trade with developed ones has gradually changed, from
passive to active form. Generally speaking, up to the end of
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World War II, the former's arguments were for "aid, not
trade." But as soon as World War II ended, "trade, not aid"
38became the slogan of developing countries.
The most prominant movement might be the creation of the
United Nations' Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
.
Over 2000 delegates representing 120 countries attending the
first meeting in Geneva in 19 64 is, in fact, an extraordinary
effort. Obviously, at the conference the developing countries
(75 in number at that time) formed a "majority front" against
the "rich but minority" group. Although many demands of this
front have not been sufficiently fulfilled, this conference
as well as the following ones, however, is certainly con-
sidered as the developing countries' appeal for trade-
cooperation send to the advanced bloc, as Dr. H. W. Singer
said
The failure of the underdeveloped countries to come closer
to the levels of the industrialized countries and to ap-
proach -them more rapidly should not be laid entirely at
the door of domestic weaknesses or handicaps implicit in
the economic structure of the underdeveloped countries.
Hence, the increasing inequality in the distribution of
world income need not be accepted as inevitable, given 3g
the present economic structure of underdeveloped countries.
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F. RESULTS OF THE "REVOLT"
The efforts mentioned above have been praised for years.
Import substitution policies were officially publicized in
Latin American countries in the late 19 40 's and in Asia in
the 1950' s. UNCTAD is already enjoying its 10 anniversary.
The results of these efforts, however, turned out to be dis-
couraging. If the beginning of the 1950 's can be marked as
the start of the "revolt" in the developing bloc, the results
at the end of the 1960's can be evaluated by the following
facts
:
— Relative economic capacity - The Periphery's total gross
domestic product experienced an average annual growth
rate of 4.8 per cent, that is a little higher than
that of the center, which attained 4.4 per cent. How-
ever, this small difference disappears if we consider
the associated demographic increases. From this
standpoint, as should be clear, the Periphery has a
much smaller per capita rate than that of the Center,
402.5 and 3.3 per cent, respectively.
-- Internationsl Trade - The difference between two blocs
is even more significant if we consider international
trade. Between 19 4 8-196 8, in global terms, the average
annual rate of increase of the Center's exports is
much higher than that of the Periphery, 7.9 and 4.8
. . ,
41per cent, respectively.
In other words, during two decades which included even
the sixties, the decade of international effort "for the
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development of the underdeveloped," according to the slogan
of U.N. , the gap between "rich" and "poor" countries became
larger.
In that context, developing countries began questioning
whether import substitution has not been carried too far to
the detriment of more rapid, self-sustained growth. At least,
finally, they found out that along with the "more theoreti-
cal" advantages, import substitution, in reality, created so
many problems that, in fact, the net gains of this policy
were much smaller than the original expectations.
First, there is the problem of quality. Due to the lack
of technical skills and trained labor, it may be found that
initially, the domestic manufacture of certain items results
in an inferior product. Such import substitution may involve
a considerable waste of resources which will tend to offset
the advantages derived from savings of foreign exchange.
The inferior quality of goods is also one major obstacle in
the way of exporting in the latter period.
Secondly, there is the problem of production costs. The
so-called "infant industry" is usually not competitive on a
costs basis with imports of the same quality. The Argentine
automobile industry which produced cars at a cost of $5000
when they can be imported for $2000 is the universal example
42for this disadvantage. Most infant industries therefore
usually require protective tariffs or import controls, and
also export incentives or substantial subsidies if exported.
The "cost" of this protection is sometimes as high as 10 per
43
cent of gross national product.
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There is also the important problem of efficiency in allo-
cating resources. Import substitution usually leads to the
inefficient employment of factors of production. This is
the case of most developing ECAFE countries where the scarce
resource is capital, but import substituting activities are
44oriented to the capital-intensive industries.
The problem of finding sufficient foreign exchange to
carry through the industrialization programs is also a con-
stant source of worry to governments of developing countries.
Industrialization and import substitution require increased
imports of capital equipment and perhaps also increased
imports of foodstuffs in some countries. There seems no
prospect of expanding traditional primary exports to meet
these increasing import requirements, and many developing
countries have been relying on inflows of foreign capital,
and reductions of their foreign assets, to finance imports.
On one hand, foreign assets in many of these countries, in
fact, have already been reduced to a minimum level and have
to be protected by strict import and exchange control. On
the other hand, foreign capital, from the standpoint of
developing countries , "does not precisely belong to the type
of activity which generates and maintains an ideological fevor
45
propitious to social and economic development."
In addition to these disadvantages, in general the reac-
tion of the developed countries to the "appeals" of poor ones
mentioned above were almost negative. Those countries, as
one put it, "have offered many explanations but very few
46
positive proposals in matters of underdevelopment."
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Moreover, economic integration among developing countries,
if it got some successes in Latin America, is still on the
drawing board in other underdeveloped regions. The Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), for example,
although in striving to create a common market in the area
for years, is still a more political organization than an
47
economic one.
In dealing with those problems and disadvantages, it is
likely that "developing countries have come to recognize
that their growth has been trade-limited and that a new more
relevant developing policy is required in which agriculture
48
and export expansion must play a key role." However, the
49
successes of industrialization in Taiwan and Korea, start-
ing in import substitution policies, in fact shewed that the
above argument is not always the case.
Again, trade-growth relationship is coming back its
mythical state. The complexity as well as the uncertainty
and confusion of the matter are still the "veil" covering
the true face of the problem! In that context, it might be
accepted that there existed a number of different trade
theories applying to the different kinds of countries instead
of only one, an abstract and general theory.
G. THE CASE OF VIETNAM
In contrast with other developing countries, Vietnam
falls into a particular case. Not only being a developing
country, Vietnam is also a wartorn land, in which the seem-




As previously mentioned, the outward looking policy for
foreign trade, therefore was chosen in this country, not
only as a viable way to maintain the external trade, but
also as the only feasible one. The requirements of economic
development through trade, even cited as the major purpose
of the export promotion plan, was indeed ranked as the second,
while the first one should be to provide badly needed foreign
exchange to finance imports.
A closer look on the recent performance of Vietnam's
exports, as presented in the next chapter, is certainly help-
ful to realize that real situation.
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III. RECENT HISTORY OF EXPORTS FROM VIETNAM
The recent history of the Vietnamese exports can be
marked by two time milestones: the year of 1955 and of 1971,
The former was simply the first consolidating year of the
newborn' state, of which the independence was just the result
of the 1954 Geneva Conference. The latter marked the broad
changes in the Government's export policy which is going to
be the subject of the next chapter.
During that period, the export performance drastically
fluctuated, reflecting the real face of not only an under-
developed economy, but also a war-torn one, as noted by the
following analyses.
A. SOME RELEVANT CHARACTERISTICS OF EXPORTS FROM VIETNAM
Exports from Vietnam during the period of 1955-1971 can
be examined in three aspects
— Value of exports (Table I)
,
— Value of exports of selected commodities (Table II)
,
— Export trade of Vietnam with specified countries
(Table III)
,
from which some observations are marked.
1. Exports Were Very Erratic
The total value of exports of. this seventeen year
period is U.S. $788 million with the mean of 46.3 million.
The difference between the mean and the value of each year
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1955 69.0 263 -194.0 (c)
1956 45.1 218 -172.9 1,790 2.5%
1957 80.5 289 -207.5 1,960 4.1
1958 55.2 232.1 -176.9 ___< c )
1959 75.1 224.6 -149.5 ___( c )
1960 84.5 240.3 -155.8 2,340 3.6
1961 69.8 255.1 -185.3 2,330 3.0
1962 56.6 264.5 -207.9 2,550 2.2
1963 76.7 286.2 -209.5 2,570 3.0
1964 48.4 297.8 -249.4 2,830 1.7
1965 35.4 357.3 -311.9 3,0 80 1.1
1966 27.6 494.2 -466.6 3,100 0.9
1967 16.4 538.0 -521.6 3,160 .5
1968 11.7 475.3 -463.6 3,020 .4
1969 11.9 667.9 -656.0 3,140 .4
1970 11.5 550.4 -538.9 3,240 .4
1971 12.5 714.0 -701.5 3,360 .4
Sources: Vietnam Statistical Yearbook 1971 (National Insti-
tute of Statistics, Saigon: 1972)
Notes : a Minus sign (-) implies deficits
b GNP in fixed price of 1960, with US $1 = 35 VN piastre
c GNP in some years was not estimated
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words, the fluctuation in value of exports had the amplitude
varying from 75 per cent on the negative side to almost. 84
per cent on the positive one.
Based on its trend, this period could, in fact, be
divided into two parts; each one had a different pattern.
a. From 1955 to 1964
During this ten-year period, exports varied
erratically. Compared to the average value of exports of
this period, U.S. $661 million, the highest value, 84.5
million, occurred in 1960 with the excess of 18.4 million,
or 128 per cent of the average. The lowest value fell into
the year of 1956 with only 45.1 million or about 68.2 per
cent of the average.
Compared to the relative stability in the politi-
cal and military situation during that period, this fluctua-
tion reflected many weaknesses of the Vietnamese economy,
some of them are going to be mentioned in the following
sections
.
b. From 1965 to 1971
This seven year period was started by the
presence of thousands of foreign troops in the country along
with the expansion of war. This was the really worst period
of the Vietnamese exports. The value of exports decreased
drastically at an average rate of 18 per cent each year.
Comparing it to the best year for Vietnamese exports, 1960,




The contraction of exports could also be viewed
through the percentage of export to GNP. During the period
of 1955-1964, the highest was 4.1 per cent, and the average
was 2.9 per cent. In the following years, this average was
dropped down to .8 per cent, and in some years, exports
shared only .4 per cent of the GNP. This recession became
more drastic and more pessimistic comparing with the sharp
increase in imports. During the whole period, the value of
imports was almost tripled. In contrast with exports,
especially in the period of 1965-71, imports increased at a
faster rate.
In order to get a broader impression, the export
performance of some other Asian developing countries is
50presented in Table IV. These data evidently show that
exports from Vietnam were not only negligible but also in the
backward direction.
2. The Narrow Composition of Exports
The second observation is that exports from Vietnam
comprised only a few agricultural primary goods, Rice and
natural rubber were the principal export commodities of
which the contributions always got a big share in the export
value, as stated in Table II. Even though there have been
no rice exports at all since 1964, the value of exports of
these two goods were still at 84 per .cent of the total.
As cited above, such an undiversif ication in exports
existed not only in Vietnam but also in many other develop-




SOME ECAFE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
EXPORT PERFORMANCE, 1960-1971
Highest Export
Country Value Recorded 1968 1969 1970 1971
from 1960-1971
Burma 271 (1963) 111 131 106 104
Ceylon 409 (1965) 342 322 342 320
India 2,042 (1971) 1,753 1,835 2,026 2,042
Indonesia 946 (1971) 751 831 811 946
Korea, R. of 940 (1971) 455 622 835 940
Malaysia 1,680 (1970) 1,347 1,651 1,680 1,618
Philippines 1,072 (1971) 848 855 1,062 1,072
Thailand 792 (1971) 658 708 697 792
Sources: International Monetary fund,, Internation Financial
Statistics, November 1971.
the contraction in export eranings caused by the deteriora-
tion in primary exports' price. Data in Table II, for
instance, showed that the price of rubber decreased by
almost 2.5 times from 19 65 to 19 71. Export earnings were,
therefore, badly hurt!
Indeed, besides those two main trade products, tea,
duck feathers, and oil seed cake have had a modest, but
relatively stable, shares of the value of exports. On the
contrary, certain trade commodities such as cinnamon, salt,
beer and scrap iron got high export values in the 1950' s,
but then either declined or disappeared entirely from the
list of exports! Additionally, some other export commodities
began to develop since 1960 but were slowed or halted
45

completely in 1964 or 1965; this is the case of duck eggs,
sesame, peanuts, fresh fruits, kapok, and glass sand.
3. Export Market
Vietnam has had trade dealings with a rather large
number of countries, but most of its exports have concentra-
ted on a few of them only! East Asia and Western Europe have
been the principal regional markets for exports from Vietnam.
Table in, however, shows that France has been the most
important national market which consumed over 4 5 per cent of
the total value of exports. In the recent years, Japan and
Singapoie have increased their shares but they have still
been irrelevant.
Obviously, such a concentration on export market is
the very important weakness of an economy. Any disturbance
happening in the importing country is going to reciprocate
strongly on the exporting country and to dampen the fluctua-
tion of the latter' s export earnings.
The case of Vietnam is, in fact, unavoidable! The
main part of produce exporting to France has been the natural
rubber which is mostly the' product of the French-owned rubber
plantations
.
To sum up, the Vietnamese export performance in the
recent period not only reflected completely the symbolic
weaknesses of the backward economy » but also showed evidently
the downward trend in exports of a war- torn economy. This
view becomes more pessimistic if the import performance is
counted. In the late of the 1960's, export earnings of the
46

whole year, 365 days, could only support the imports for 5
days, as symbolically argued by some-. Hence, at this point,
analyzing the causes of the situation becomes necessary.
B. THE CAUSES
Naturally, nobody can reject the fact that the endless
war is the principal cause of the export's contraction in
the last two decades. Besides it, however, lack of an
appropriate export policy is also another important one!
1. The War
Traditionally, Vietnam is an agricultural country in
which almost 80 per cent of the population earned their
living by the land. South Vietnam, for a long time, has
been a very fertile soil area so that it was named the South-
51
east Asia's rice bowl sometimes. In 1939, there existed
already over three millions paddy planted hectares and over
52
one million tons of rice exported.
Unfortunately, the war ruined that prosperous agri-
culture. At least, the war's destruction can be viewed
through two aspects: changes in labor forces and the stag-
nation in planted areas.
a. Labor Force in the Agricultural Sector
During war time, the population employed in agri-
cultural sector decreased significantly. The reasons are as
follows
:
-- the unsecurity in the countryside forced a lot of war
refugaes out of their land, moving to cities where they
have been more secure!
47

— through the total mobilization program, most of the
young and healthy men have had to engage in the mili-
tary forces of one side or the other. For only the
government side, armed forces strength increased from
640 thousands of personnel in 1965 to over 1,150
53thousands in 19 71. If police forces and civilian
employment were included, those figures became 818
and 1,415, respectively.
— the presence of crowded foreign troops in the country
created a prosperous service sector with higher income
earnings. Hence, this sector attracted many employees
from other ones, especially the agriculture where
income is usually low.
According to the United Nations' survey, in 1971, the man-
power employed in agricultural sector was only 60 per cent
of the total labor force, comparing to over 80 per cent in
the 1950's. 54
b. Planted Areas
Along with the war expansion, planted areas were
reduced substantially. Besides the lack of manpower to
exploiter planted areas were destroyed by war materials, in
55particular herbicides. Table V presents the planted areas
for two main agricultural export goods, paddy and rubber,
during the war time. The data of this table shows that the
recovery in paddy planted areas is noted evidently since
1967-1968, however the declining trend in the areas for
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TABLE V
PADDY AND RUBBER, PLANTED AREAS, 1963-70
(in hectares)









as and Statistics Service
(Vietnam Statistical Yearbook 1971)
.
Because of these two main weaknesses caused by the
war, the production of the agricultural sector had to be
decreased. This declination could be presented by the agri-
culture production's index per capita. If the index of
1961-65 was selected as the base, it became only 80 in 1966
and even 74 in 1968. Although there existed an increase at
the end of the 196 0's, the agricultural production index per
capita was still only 92 in 1971.
In fact, many governmental programs have been pro-
moted in the efforts to boast the agricultural production.
Land reform programs and the expansion of farm credit and




and the popularization of the new high-yielding seeds, in
particular rice production. Rice, however, has not been
enough for the domestic consumption.
In summary, the war has created the shortage of
production, particularly in agricultural sector; domestic
demand, therefore, exceeded supply and finally the declina-
tion of exports is inevitable!
But war has not been the whole thing which caused
the sharp exports' contraction. It is argued that lack of
an overall economic policy, in general, or indeed an appro-
priate export strategy, in particular, was the other reason
of that situation.
2. Lack of an Export Policy
It is likely that^ there existed a paradox in the
performance of the Vietnamese foreign trade: even though it
is a backward country, Vietnam had some patterns of a highly
developed country's foreign trade, according to Kindle-
57berger's model. These patterns could be simply explained
as follows. Although the balance of trade's deficits have
been enormous and lasted for years , the Vietnamese balances-
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of-payments were almost equitable. Moreover, imported
commodities are mostly composed of consumer goods.
The permanent and enormous inflow of foreign military
expenditure and stabilization aid were the magic power to
create and will nourish that paradox.
During the war, besides the existence of almost 600
thousand military men of allied forces in its peak, the
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amount of American civilians contracted, and third country
nationals employed by U.S. contractors to military exceeded
the number of 30,000. Moreover, over 150,000 Vietnamese
were employed in U.S. military sector - for U.S. military
authorities as well as for U.S. contractors to military.
The U.S. military expenditures in Vietnam, therefore,
included all above-spending as well as the purchase of local
goods. In order to fund these expenditures, the U.S. govern-
ment had to exchange U.S. dollars for Vietnamese piastres,
therefore a service called "U.S. piastre purchase" was
created from 1965. Such official purchase varied between
U.S. $74 million in 1965 and 403 million in 1971. This
source of foreign exchange was evidently a substantial fund
to finance imports.
In addition, the Commercial Import Program (CIP) , a
kind of economic aid of the United States to the Vietnamese
Government was the other important source of dollars. This
aid fund grew from the average of U.S. $150-200 million
during 1957-1964, to double the amount in the following
years. As piastres, this fund covered most of the govern-
ment's budget deficit, and as dollars, it made possible, and
indeed encouraged, massive imports.
If these funds are used as a counter-balance to
trade deficits, the so-called "balance-of-trade after foreign
aids" turns out to be magically surplus most of the time.
The Vietnamese economy is thus an extraordinarily dependent
economy in which "the external resources - the foreign
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military expenditures and stabilization aid - overwhelmingly
59determine the level of income," as noted by Buu Hoan.
In such an artificially prosperous environment, the
exportation was not considered as a necessary activity and
naturally, there was no reason to promote export policy.
In connection with this weakness, war also created
a situation in which exporters didn't have the motivation in
their affairs.
3. Lack of Motivation in Export Activities
The Vietnamese economic system, in the wartime,
facilitated the abnormal expansion of the service sector
which in 1969 accounted for 54 per cent of GNP, at the
expense of the primary and the secondary sectors , as
described in table VI. It favors in particular economic
activities in import trade and in the supply of goods and
services to allied forces and American civilian personnel.
The business environment is such that it tends to encourage
the non-productive sort of entrepreneurial ingenuity.
Along with these facts, a highly overvalued exchange
rate has accentuated the disadvantages in export activities
.
This unrealistic rate, reflected on the difference between
official and black market rate, as noted in Table VI, kept
down the basic cost of imports but also undermined the com-
petitiveness of Vietnamese goods on overseas markets.
Summarizing, as Myint put it:
In such circumstances, a businessman's primary thing is
that he gets so much profit by trying to get import
license from the government, particularly with overvalued




THE TRUE FACE OF VIETNAMESE ECONOMY
1964 1966 1969
National Budget (as % of revenues)
- Customs duties 39 57 54
- Budget deficit (excluded foreign aid) 140 60 71





4. Net factor income from abroad







Exchange Rate (Piasters per U.S. dollar)
- Official rate
- Free market rate
Price Index (1960 = 100) 120 263 569
Sources: Statistical Year Book 1971.
getting import license or getting around government controls
rather than in improving his productivity in any ordinary
way. You cannot blame him; he has no incentive! °^
In brief, the war - on the one hand, by its real nature
- has ruined partly the productivity "of the economy. Mean-
while, through its strange mechanism, it created a prosperous
appearance, on the other. Such a type of prosperous economy














the wind. Whenever the wind stops, the kite falls down
immediately. The wind here is the huge inflow of external
resources. And this inflow will not be existed infinitely.
In the early 1970' s, there were some signs warning
that the war had intended to change its course. The so-
called "Vietnamesation programs" were put in action, and
followed the withdrawal of foreign troops. Furthermore, the
political climate in the donating country became unfavorable
for the easy and huge amount of foreign aid. The wind which
had pushed the kite seemed to become weaker and weaker!
At that point, one may think about cutting down imports
to lessen the economic dependency on foreign resources.
However, such a measure was strictly bounded by many politi-
cal and economic constraints. In a purely economic viewpoint,
in dealing with the inflation in which prices have increased
by over 30 percent anually, any reduction in imports will
hurt the economy by the way of increase in inflation rate.
Moreover, as table VI shows it, about half of the budget
revenues came from customs duties which were positively
related to import level, thus a decrease in imports will
immediately worsen the budget deficit that had been bad
enough during war time.
In that context, export promotion seems to be the only




IV. NEW EXPORT POLICY
On November 15, 1971, the President of the Republic
of Vietnam declared the determination of the country for
promoting "the rapid economic development" which opened new
room for exports. Export promotion, through this declaration,
might be seen as the most decisive condition for the economy
to be self-sufficient and self-progressive. As the President
put it, "Expansion of exports is an objective of the highest
priority in the national endeavor to achieve economic
independence .
"
Following this general declaration, a whole new export
policy was issued by the government. In fact, this policy
may be considered as the first one in the foreign trade
affairs of the country. Previously, there existed no expli-
cit policy at all.
A. THE NEW POLICY
The new export policy was formed by several decrees and
laws issued after Nov. 15, 1971. Those governmental activi-
ties have created numerous structural and institutional
changes in the related area. In brief, the new policy can
be viewed through the following facets:
1. Objectives
Since exportation is one of many activities of the
whole economy, export policy should be included in the frame
of the general economic plan, of which, in the case of
Vietnam, self-sufficiency and self-progress are the main
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goals. Following that trend, exports are considered as
means to
a. Collect enough foreign exchange to free the
economy
b. Contribute to the increase of GNP




In order to achieve the above objectives, some prin-
ciples are set as the basis for the new export policy.
Indeed, right in the declaration on Nov. 15, 19 71, some
general guiding principles for "the economic development
arena" were clearly stressed, such as "the principle of
private ownership and free enterprise," or "the spirit of
free trade," etc. However, in export area, the principles
are set for not only the private sector but also for the
government.
According to their content, these principles may be
grouped as
:
a. Principles on Producing
— production is oriented to exports, not to import-
substitutions ;
— Export diversification, as well as the expansion
to new foreign markets, are urgent requirements
to promote the exports;
manufactured products should be paid more atten-
tion than the primary ones;
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the spirit of free trade is advocated, however
the transaction period should be considered as
necessary in order to transform the domestic
production from the protective state to a com-
petitive one;
in the short run, in order to increase exports,
domestic consumption should be tightened!
b. Principles on Pricing
"domestic infant industries" will be provided a
"flexible and rational protection" for growth
while enhancing the competitiveness of their
products at home and abroad. However, this kind
of protection will not support inefficient indus-
tries with no prospect for progress.
— many kinds of taxes are partly applied, or
furthermore, in some cases, not applied at all,
to the export commodities in order to reduce
their prices, i.e., to increase their competitive-
ness on the overseas markets.
for the same purpose, special low-interest rate
short-term credits are provided to exporters.
c. Principles on Overseas Markets
the main consumer markets for Vietnamese exports
are developed countries where the competition
has become more and more drastic; improvement in
the exports' quality as well as in the supply
capability thus should be considered as the con-
stant worry of the Vietnamese exporters.
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— expansion of new markets is also vital for Viet-
namese exports in order to avoid the disadvan-
tages of the export market's concentration.
— advertising should be viewed as one of the most
urgent activities needed to expand the overseas
markets.
Those principles have been the roots of many privileges and
incentives provided for exporters in order to push exports.
3. Export Privileges
Export privileges preserved in the new policy range
from the governmental monetary subsidy to the exporters to
the simpler procedures provided for them in going abroad.
a. Export Subsidy
Export affairs are enjoying the highest exchange
rate. For example, in Nov. 1973, the official rate was
VN $535/US $1, but for export affairs, exchange rate was
VN $575/US $1, i.e., for each dollar earning, the exporter
is provided VN $40 subsidy from the government. From Janu-
ary 14, 1974, this export premium was replaced by a subsidy
consisting of direct payments to the exporter equivalent to
the cost of financing the export for 3 months at an interest
rate of 26 per cent per annum.
Moreover, the newly exported commodities yield
more gains to their owners. An additional amount of VN $25
is provided to the exporter for each dollar earning; it
means that the exchange rate in the previous case became
VN $600/US $1. This special subsidy - viewed as a measure
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to diversify exports - is, however applied to new exports in
the first 12 months only.
New export products, in the scope of this subsidy,
included:
commodity which was never exported prior to the
export declaration on 31 Dec 1971,
-- commodity which was exported in the past but
meets both the following conditions:
1. It has to have one of the characteristics
described below:
o new basic raw materials are used in its
production,
° new manufacturing process is applied,
° commodity is put in new form
v
2. its value is higher than before and its
foreign exchange earnings is also higher* —
b. Exchange Privilege
Exporters are permitted to keep 10 per cent of
their foreign exchange earning in order to pay the expenses
relating to the export operation in foreign countries. This
amount of foreign exchange should be deposited in a special
account - the so-called "subordinate expense account" -
opened at the intermediary banks recognized in VN.
c. Credit Privilege
Special short-term credits can be provided to
exporters to help them in financial aspects. Their maximum
is six months, but it can be prolonged. Their anual interest
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rate is 17 to 19 per cent comparing to the usual rate of over
30 per cent in other affairs.
d. Taxes Privilege
Export industries enjoy completely the special
privilege clauses prepared in the new investment law No. 03/72
which was issued on June 2, 19 72. By the terms of this law,
important privileges in taxes included
-- permanent exemptions for mortgaging fees of
fixed assets, for income tax on dividends distri-
buted to shareholders, etc.
— 5 year exemptions for registration fees and stamp
duty on deeds, for real estates acquisition fees,
for taxes on royalties and patents, etc.
Moreover, export duties are completely exempted, and value
added taxes are not applied to exports!
e. Other Privileges
Besides above mentioned privileges, export sector
is also supported in many other ways.
Export industries are receiving all the ease to
import equipments and machinery as well as raw
materials needed. They are also in the highest
priority to enjoy the so-called temporary import
regim, i.e., those industries are exempted for
import duties for their imported materials in
manufacturing the re-exported commodities
!
Exporters are allowed to go abroad easily to
seek for export markets; very simple procedure
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in the administration is preserved for those
movements. If their foreign exchange earning
excessed US $100,000 per year, they can go abroad
successively, in the so-called "visa-multiple
regim. " If their earning falls between US $50,000
and $100,000, they can go to 4 times each year.
— Exporters are encouraged and fully supported to
attend international fairs and displays in order
to advertise their products.
In addition, monetary policy which has played a vital role in
shaping the export performance was also changed.
4. Exchange Reform
In common with other improvements, exchange reform
laid its foundation on the Nov. 15, 1971 declaration which
said: "the Government will implement a program of fundamen-
tal reforms to eliminate irrationalities and inefficiencies
6 3in the exchange system. . . " The great and grave turning
point of the Vietnamese exchange policy was the devaluation
of the domestic currency from an official rate of 118 to a
new rate of 410 piasters per U.S. dollar, right after this
declaration. Following that step, in order to keep the
realistic rates of exchange, an exchange system, mostly like
the floating system, was applied, in which exchange rates were
revised by the monetary authorities every two weeks or so,
based upon the demand and supply on the foreign exchange
market. Needless to say, this reform could also be viewed
as a measure to remove much of the excess demand for imports,




Some major changes in the exchange rate during the
recent years are chronologically listed in Table VII, partic-
ularly emphasizing on exports 1 rates.
TABLE VII
EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES FROM OCT. 1, 1967 TO JAN. 14, 1974
Date Official Rate Merchandise Export Rate
Oct. 1, 1967 118 a 118
Oct. 5, 1970 118 275
June 7, 1971 118 350b
Nov. 15, 1971 118 410
Apr. 1, 1972 410 410
Apr. 29, 1972 420 420
May 22, 1972 500
July 28, 1972 430 550 C
Jan. 3, 1973 465 565 C
Jan. 26, 1973 475 575 C
Apr. 27, 1973 485 d
Jan. 14, 1974 560 560e
Sources: Vietnam Economic Data, A.I.D., Feb. 74.
Notes
a. Official rate of 80 plus an Economic consolidation
surtax of 38 piasters on foreign exchange transactions
b. includes the 275 parallel rate plus a subsidy of 75
piasters
c. plus an additional 25 piasters export subsidy for the
first year on new products
d. effective Apr. 27, 1973, export subsidy reduced from
100 piasters per dollar to the difference between the
changing GVN rate and 575: $1. The additional 25 piaster
subsidy will continue to be paid on new products.
e. Export premium replaced by a subsidy consisting of direct
payments to the exporter equivalent to the cost of financ-




Along with these institutional. improvements, organizational
changes also took a great part in the new export policy.
4. New Organizations for Export Promotion
In order to create an appropriate frame for the
export promotion programs, the governmental structure in the
export sector is reorganized and these changes rooted in the
following principles:
— universality of the export promotion's importance
to mobilize all efforts for exports,
— unification of command in order to get sufficient
outcomes in planning, coordinating and promoting
export activities,
simplification in the administrative procedure
relating to exports to encourage the export activities
Based upon those principles, new organizations are set up,
as well as some old ones are consolidated. Following are
some examples
.
a. National Export-Development Council (NEDC)
Established by the Decree-Law No. 677 on Nov. 15,
641971, the National Export Development Council is the nucleus
of the new export programs. This council is composed of a
good cross-section of higher government officials and the
representatives of the private sector, and is put under the
chairmanship of the Prime Minister. NEDC is given the
responsibilities for setting goals and designing plans for
the export programs as well as strengthening the cooperation
between the government and the private sector for the export
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drive. In other words, this council represents the broad
basis of the export policy which previously concentrated on
the sole responsibility of the Economic Minister.
b. Export Development Center (EDC)
This center was originally established in 1964.
After the birth of the new export programs, EDC was reorganized
to undertake efficiently programs set by NEDC. Its principal
activities include the following:
— the survey and exploration of overseas markets
for specific commodities, the dissemination of
information about overseas markets, and the
promotion of the export trade,
the promotion of export industries and their
products to facilitate their entrance into over-
seas markets,
the encouragement of export industries and the
preparation of merchandising plans for export
goods
,
participation in international trade fairs, exhi-
bitions and idsplays,
publication of export trade data and of other
literature for the promotion of exports,
— providing loans and credits to exports.
c. Export Processing Zones (EPZ's)
EPZ's are preserved by the Decree-Law No. 043 on
Dec. 23, 1972 and have the purpose to make use of labor
advantage to increase exports. Enjoying mostly the autonomy
6 4

in administration, these production centers are expected to
be financed by foreign capital and oriented especially to
manufactured export goods. To encourage the foreign invest-
ments, many privileges and guarantees have been assured, such
as tax exemptions, guarantees of non-competitiveness and non-
nationalization, etc.
c. Free Tariff Ports
In order to exploite the sea ports located near
the international water routes - Vung Tau and Cam Ranb port
in particular - the "free tariff ports" regulation is set
up to permit domestic and foreign commodities, including
raw materials, semi-products, as well as finished products
to entrance in order to manufacture, finish, wrap up or even
store in waiting for exporting with no tariff or ether taxes
at all. Production activities in these ports are also
provided many privileges and guarantees.
B. SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE NEW EXPORT POLICY
Through the above brief presentation of the new policy's
figure, some relevant points are worth mentioning here.
First, this is the "outward looking policy." In contrast
to many developing countries which follow the inward looking
policy through import-substitution, as noted in the previous
chapters, Vietnam strives to expand exports. Reasons for
this attitude can be easily recognized. Since the habit of
consuming foreign goods has become deeply rooted in a great
part of the Vietnamese population, it can not be wasted in
a short time. In the meanwhile, the ideological struggle
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happening in the country doesn't permit the public authorities
to apply freely "strong" measures to cut down sharply the
demand for foreign goods, even though they are facing a
critical difficulty in balance-of-payments. In such contexts,
as mentioned previously, export expansion is the only feasible
way to maintain a relatively high level of imports and to avoid
a complete dependency on foreign resources.
Secondly, manufactured products are specially emphasized
in the new policy. This trend can be seen through the
creations of export processing zones and free tariff ports.
With this consideration, the question may be raised as to why
Vietnam renounces its traditional agriculture and follows the
other way, in which there exist many disadvantages. In fact,
besides the reason that like other developing countries,
Vietnam wants to industrialize its economy, there is another
one: the insecurity in the countryside puts a limit on the
agricultural expansion! The case of rice has strongly sup-
ported this fact.
The role of the government is also worth mentioning. The
governmental intervention and stimulation have played the
greater part in the export promotion programs. This feature
reflects on the institutional as well as on the structural
systems. This trend is also familiar in the developing
world where economic development became an intensely political
matter, a business for the governments. Moreover, the end-
less war has created a confused and surfeited climate which,
in turn, gradually undermines the investment activities as
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well as the production in the private sector. Export promo-
tion, therefore, can not be relied upon by private initiative!
Finally, in general, the measures composed in the new
policy are not originally established by the national public
authorities. In fact, the new export policy might be seen
as a model imitated from the experiences of other developing
countries, in particular the East and Southeast Asian ones.
The National Export Development Council (NEDC) , for instance,
is mostly similar to the Korean's Joint Export Development
Committee established in 1963 and known later as the Export
Promotion Subcommittee, or EPSC. This steering committee
has successfully operated because the Korean president has
personally attended to its meeting and has been reported to
directly.
In addition, Export Development Center, after being
reorganized, is also similar in its organization and functions
to Korean Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) or to Japan's
External Trade Organization. The Vietnamese EDC ' s efforts
to organize the so-called Trade Missions are almost the same
as KOTRA 's experiences in the activities of Trade Centers.
The concept of Export Processing Zones in the new policy
is certainly adapted to the Taiwan's experiences, in which
the development of industrial zones is the major factor in
the rapid growth of Taiwan's exports. Kaohsiung Export
Processing Zones, located in Southern Taiwan, is exactly the
model for the future EPZ's in Vietnam: autonomy in adminis-
tration, no import duties on machinery and equipment brought
into it, no restrictions or duties on raw materials and
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semi-finished products brought into it for processing, loans
provided at low rates of interest for plant construction,
etc. 67
Needless to say, the regulation of Free Tariff Ports is
completely imitated from the models of Hong Kong and Singapore,
In summary, the new export programs in Vietnam can be
described as a combination of many developing countries'
experiences. The result of this imitation is, however hard
to be evaluated right now because time is not long enough to
judge its performance. In fact, after almost two years in
application, some short-term results of the new policy could
be realized.
C. SHORT TERM RESULTS OF THE NEW POLICY
The Vietnamese export performance in the period following
the declaration of export promotion seems to be in an opti-
mistic trend. Values of exports in 1972 and in the first ten
months of 1973, presented in Table VIII, have strongly suppor-
ted this observation.
This table shows that there existed an increase by 80 per
cent of export items in 1972, compared to those in 1971, and
export value in the first ten months of 1973 doubled that of
1972.
The upward trend of export activities also reflects on
the other facets of export sector. Due to the favorable
conditions for exporters such as abolition of complicated
procedures, giving easy conditions to the in-country transport




VALUES OF EXPORTS OF PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES IN 1972 AND
IN THE FIRST 10 MONTHS OF 197 3








Fish products 5,493 24.2 9,220 20.0
Woods 2,951 13.0 10,695 23.2
Discarded Iron 2,497 11.0 5,763 15.5
Others 4,540 20.0 13,968 30.3
TOTAL 22,700 100.0 46,100 100.0
Source: NBVN
as of October 1973 amounted to 1047 in comparison with 11 in
fi 8
19 71. ' The quantity of exported goods also increased from
64 tons in 1971 to 152 in 1972 and 197 tons in the first ten
months of 1973. Customers of Vietnamese products also rose
from 22 countries in 1971 to 37 in 1973.
Based on that optimistic trend, public authorities in
the country estimate that exports can reach the 100 million
mark in 1974 - the double of the 1973 and some 400 per cent
69higher than the 1972 total. According to that estimation,
woods and wood manufactures will be the leading export items
which share 25 per cent of the total value. Fish products
will be the next ones with 20 per cent
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Obviously, this estimate is based upon the assumption that
the military condition is stable throughout the period.
The above results are, indeed, only the short-term ones.
In long run, the total picture can turn out to be not as
optimistic as the current estimations. Reason for this is
the fact that some main items of the current export list do
not have the strong and long-term stands. For instance,
discarded iron and waste military gears which, in total,
share over 20 per cent of the export value are very tempor-
ary and can be exhausted very soon. So do the pine woods, of
which, as of now, there exists no replanting program.
Moreover, it has been argued that these recent government
efforts to promote exports have been excessive - that they
were inefficient because they provide unnecessarily large
awards to the exporters , that they encouraged exports of
commodities in which Vietnam did not have a comparative
advantage, This is also the case of Korea in a recent
70period. There is, however, ample justification for such
measures because Vietnamese exports have been so low in
relation to import levels. It would be unreasonable, of
course, to suggest that such strong incentives should be
carried on indefinitely.
In the long term point of view, export prospects for
Vietnam should, therefore, be viewed through the real capa-
bility of the Vietnamese economy, as well as through the
demand for Vietnamese goods on overseas markets.
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V. EXPORT PROSPECTS FOR VIETNAM
The recent increase in exports from Vietnam may be viewed
as a good signal for its export prospects, on the one hand,
but it may also be interpreted as an artificial boom in the
export sector, caused by the excessive governmental subsidies
to exporters; meanwhile, the export production mechanism
hasn't had a comparative advantage.
In order to get a real and broad view on the Vietnamese
export prospects, studies should, therefore, be made on the
Veitnamese exportable commodities, as well as on the potential
export markets for them.
In fact, there were not lacking such studies. Some of
them were the products of professional groups or organiza-
71tions, and, in general, thexr values have been undeniable.
However, because they were completed at the end of the 1960 's,
these studies did not include recent events which should be
taken into consideration to estimate the future.
In the context of this paper, only some principal
patterns of the Vietnamese export prospects are going to be
presented, in order to avoid the repetition of what has been
described in previous studies. The sole exception is that
updating corrections will be clearly .pointed out.
Generally, the export prospects of the agricultural
sector are emphasized the most. However some promising





Even though several governmental efforts have been
devoted to the manufacturing sector, agricultural products
are still going to share the main part of the export earn-
ings of Vietnam for a very long time into the future. In
that trend, needless to say, rice and natural rubber are
still the logical candidates for export in the near future,
especially during the post war era. Along with these two
principal products, some other agricultural goods, including
woods, sea products, etc., are also promising exports.
1. Rice
As noted, Vietnam was a traditionally rice-exporting
country. At its peak, in the early 19 60's, Vietnam exported
over 300,000 tons of rice, at a time when exports from Far
Eastern countries were about 3.8 million tons. The market
share was slightly under 10 per cent, and the principal
markets were in the same region, notably Hong Kong and Singa-
pore. Rice exports, however, ceased after 1964 due to the
heavy fighting in the countryside, and since then, Vietnam
has been a net importer. This country has, indeed, the pro-
duction capacity to become a rice exporter again, even
though the war has not completely finished. The fertility
of soil and the recent improvements in the agricultural
sector could be used as proofs.
Despite the war going on, several measures have been
carried on to improve the rice production. The Land Reform
Program, the expansion of agricultural credits, the applica-
tion of new high-yielding "miracle" rice seeds, and the
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modernization in agricultural sector have contributed to the
increase in rice production. Taking the period of 1959-61
as the base, the index of paddy production fell from its peak
at 112.0 in 1963 (or 5.3 million metric tons) to the lowest
point at 88.8 in 1966 (or 4.3 million). Following those
mentioned improvements, this index increased up to 117.0 in
1970 (5.7 million), and only lightly decreased during the
disastrous battles in 1972. Even though this growth in rice
production hasn't been enough to meet the domestic demand, it
is strongly believed that when the war ends, this increase
is going to speed up, due to the security in the country-
side, as well as to labor force increasing in that sector.
The growth of world demand for rice and of rice pro-
duction also presents Vietnam with promising prospects for
rice exports.
72Although, through Engel's law, as income grows,
the demand for rice grows less than proportionately, this
demand, especially in all of the Far Eastern countries, will
continue to grow significantly, owing to the high population
rates of growth and to high income elasticities of demand
- . 73for rice.
On the supply side, world rice production increased
continually during the later half of the 1960 's. Apart from
the increase in the acreage planted, continuing technological
progress, and in particular the growing use of the high-
74yielding varieties, contributed to the increase. Import
demand for rice, therefore, was limited, owing to better
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crops in many importing countries, while export supplies were
considerably increased. As a result of this fact, the price
of rice decreased, along with the fall in value of world rice
trade, despite higher volume. Most developing exporting
countries earned less from rice exports for the years during
the late 19 60's and the early 19 70 's. 75
However, the recent droughts in some parts of India
and China and floods in Pakistan inverted this optimistic
76trend. Moreover, the so-called current "energy crisis"
which strongly affects the chemical fertilizers which, in
turn, have had detrimental effects on the result of the
"green revolution," has accentuated the food problem. Import
demand for rice, in that context, should be expanded. In
fact, Vietnamese peasants are also being hurt by the sharp
increase of prices of chemical fertilizer. However, like
some other countries in the eastern Pacific Basin, the
natural fertility of land in Vietnam has, in some .instances,
partly reduced this bad effect, and rice is still a promising
export for Vietnam.
For the export rice markets, Vietnam could easily
reestablish itself in traditional markets, such as Hong Kong
and Singapore, due to the fact that there still exists a
close relationship between the "Chinese" rice exporters in
77Vietnam and the Chinese importers in these countries. In
the future, Vietnam should look to other markets, particularly
to Indonesia and possibly to India. Japan was once viewed
... . .78
as a potentially promising rice importer in the region, but
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recently, the self-sufficient rice policy of Japan has been
incredibly successful, and it turned out in some years, due
to the high price of world rice, Japan became the net
79
exporter of rice.
In summary, rice, in all likelihood, is going to re-
gain its leading role in the export earnings for Vietnam when
the war ends. Competition in the rice supply can, however,
increase in the future and the country may be faced with
the problem of new markets for its rice exports in the dis-
tant future. In that case, emphasis on quality grades of
rice, as demand is upgraded, should provide a guide to
production policy in Vietnam.
2. Natural Rubber
In the past, rubber shared a major portion in the
Vietnamese foreign exchange earnings from exports. In the
mid-1960' s, when production was at relatively high levels,
rubber represented almost three fourths of Vietnam's total
export earnings. This level, however, shared only 5 per
cent of the total world production.
During war time, rubber production has suffered more
than rice has from war destruction. Battles have taken
place on many plantations. The shortage of labor and the
lack of care of the trees reduced the yield sharply. Index
of rubber production has been drastically decreased, from
100 in 1959-61, to 84.1 in 1965, then at only 55.2 in 1967,
8
and 40.0 in 1970. As noted, even though no estimation
exists yet, this index has fallen more and more, due to the
recent and current battles concentrated on production areas.
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Although present conditions are depressing, there are
favorable prospects for future natural rubber in Vietnam. In
the past several years , world production of this product has
not kept pace with expanding world consumption, even though
the competition of synthetic rubber has increased in inten-
sity. Natural rubber stocks have been drawn down, and in
1968, the gap between consumption and production reached
81
about 200,000 metric tons. This gap certainly is expand-
ing more widely in the current period, owing to the high
price of oil, from which the synthetic rubber is derived.
In addition, Vietnam's rubber has the relative super-
iority as a result of favorable soil and climatic conditions,
its freedom from serious disease, and the skill and produc-
tivity of the Vietnamese labor force, derived from over
82
seventy years' experience of rubber cultivation. Further-
more, Vietnam has a tradition of exporting natural rubber
and trading channels have been established, even though they
are currently disrupted. Because of the French ownership of
most plantations, there is a ready market in France for
virtually all the forseeable production expansion in the
near future.
To sum up, due to the quality of the product, as
well as to the trend of its world consumption and production,
natural rubber should be a very promising export for Vietnam
when the fight ceases. However, to regain the production
level of the early 1960's, the rubber plantations will need
extensive investment in rehabilitation. It is worth noting
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that, along with the prospects for exporting, natural rubber
is expected to become one of the major raw materials for the
domestic industries in the post war era. One source esti-
mated that between 30 and 40 per cent of the rubber produced
83
could be utilized locally.
3. Wood and Wood Products
The increasing shares of exported wood and wood
products in the foreign earnings in recent years have proved
the promising role of these goods in the export prospects of
Vietnam.
In fact, up to the 19 60 's, in Vietnam, all lands with
trees whose crowns cover more than 20 per cent - or 12 million
hectares - of the area were not used primarily for purposes
84
other than forestry. Even though not all of these trees
could be used in industries, tropical hardwoods and conifers
have an established place in the world market.
In addition to the abundance of wood resources, the
international market conditions also presented Vietnam with
a good opportunity to market its wood resources abroad.
World consumption and international trade in wood and wood
products is growing substantially. During the last decade,
the rate of expansion in world trade has been almost three
times that of world production, or 10 per cent vs. 3.5 per
85
cent, respectively. There are, however, substantial dif-
ferences in market trends for each category of wood and wood
products. In recent years, the market for log and sawed
woods has declined in the more developed countries, but it
77

still has a vigorous and expanding market in Asia. On the
contrary, there is an inverse situation in the world trade
for wood panels. The developed countries are big markets
for these products - especially the United States. Wood
pulp products are also concentrated in the developed nations'
markets. However, as the rate of growth and level of income
per capita determined the consumption of paper and paper
products, as in the past, the Asian market - in percentage
increase - is among the highest of the geographic regions.
In brief, Vietnamese resources of wood are abundant
and varied, and the international market condition shows
that these resources have the promising potentials in export.
Yet, in order to keep a continuing forestry resource, plan-
ning the rehabilitation of the nation's forests should be
considered as a high priority in the economic development
plans.
4 . Fishery Products
In the first ten months of 1973, foreign exchange
earnings coming from fishery product exports reached the
level of 9.3 million dollars, or equal to the total fishery
export earnings during the entire period of 1958 to 1966.
This amazing increase is partly due to the fact that, along
with a coastal length of 2,500 kilometers, the numerous
internal ponds and rivers in the mainland provide a wide
variety of fishery products to Vietnam. The export prospects
are going to be more promising if the current over 270,000
fishermen force is well trained and well equipped.
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Trends in production and trade of world fishery pro-
ducts also present Vietnam a good prospect for export. During
the past decade, both world production and trade of fish and
fish products have increased steadily. Over 70 per cent,
by value, of world exports of these products is destined for
markets in six major developed countries: the United States,
86the United Kingdom, West Germany, France, Italy, and Japan.
In Asia, Japan is the dominant importing - as well as export-
ing - nation, whose major imports are fresh and frozen shrimp,
seaweed, and fish meal. For years, Japan, Hong Kong, and
Singapore have been the major importing countries of Viet-
namese sea products, especially forzen shrimp. In 1973, the
87United States entered this list. With the recent and
current success in this activity, sea products became some
of the most promising exports for Vietnam in the future.
5. Other Agricultural Products
In addition to the commodities covered in the previous
sections, there are many others that have been exported in the
past, plus new commodities that may be added in the future.
For any one such commodity, the market demand or the poten-
tially available supplies are relatively small in comparison
to rice, rubber, wood products, or fishery goods. They may
not add large amounts to export earnings individually, but
collectively, they sum up to a significant total value. A




Because of its continuity, tea has been Vietnam's
largest source of export earnings over the past decade,
except for rice and rubber. Its prospect, however, is not
very bright, because supplies have outstripped demand and
8 8prices have fallen steadily. (" For the export markets, over
90 per cent of tea exports from Vietnam went to the United
Kingdom in the past, and it is strongly believed that in the
future, this market will be the largest single one. The only
other markets of significance to Vietnam tea are Singapore,
Hong Kong, France, and Germany.
On the other hand, vegetable oils and their by-products,
oil cake and meal, have never ranked as major exports of
Vietnam, but still, they have provided a significant source
of foreign exchange in the past that might be increased in
the future. Coconut and peanut oil are the two major oils
exported from this country and the Japanese market, although
much smaller than that of developed countries in Europe, is
the major one in Asia and has been growing rapidly. The out-
look for oil cake and neal is brighter because the world
demand for them is expected to grow much faster than that of
vegetable oil. This probably presents an export opportunity
for Vietnam to the two major import markets, Japan and
Western Europe.
Cinnamon is also a traditional export from Vietnam.
While there appears to have been some deteriorations in the
competitive position of Vietnamese cinnamon in the United
States market over the past years, due to the discontinuity
in supply, it is concluded that Vietnam still can sell 2 to
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3 million dollars worth per year, if the security in exploi-
89tation has been improved. The United States is not, of
course, the only market for Vietnamese cinnamon. Japan,
Singapore, and South Korea might be counted upon for future
sales of this product.
Fruits and vegetables are also minor primising
exports from the country. The consumption of fruits and
vegetables, particularly in the Asian areas, in increasing
considerably. This expansion in the foreign markets, together
with Vietnam's capacity to produce fruits and vegatables,
offers a promising opportunity for Vietnam's entry into the
trade. Some parts in the highland of central Vietnam, in
particular the Dalat area, have the extremely favorable
physical condition for growing vegetables, and production
can be expanded at least two or three times the present
levels without great difficulty. This area can concentrate
production especially on the high-value products, such as
asparagus, artichokes, strawberries and melons, which are in
greatest demand in export trade. The traditional customers
for Vietnamese vegetables have been Hong Kong and Singapore,
and in recent years, Japan started to be interested in
90Vietnamese fruits, particularly in bananas.
Along with these products, duck feathers, duck eggs,
peanuts, coffee, jute, kenaf , salt, pepper, kapok and sesame
are other minor commodities that should be able to supplement
Vietnam's foreign exchange earnings in the post war period.
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Export prospects for Vietnam, however, are not
bounded by those agricultural products alone. There are
other possibilities of export earnings in manufactured com-
modities.
B. EXPORT PROSPECTS OF MANUFACTURING SECTOR
In the viewpoint of some Vietnamese planners, the manufac-
turing sector is going to play a major part for the export
prospects of this country. This implication is reflected on
the following statement, quoted from the President's declara-
tion on investment and export promotion on November 15, 1971:
All necessary measures will be undertaken to foster an
invigorating business climate and lay the foundation for
a growing and healthy industrial sector capable of meet-
ing the challenge of domestic and international
competition . ^
^
The new investment law, and laws regulating export processing
zones and free tariff ports are certainly some "necessary
measures" to create good opportunities for the growth of
manufacturing sector.
In fact, as noted, the insecurity in the countryside
hasn't permitted the development of the agricultural sector.
Hence, the expansion of the manufacturing sector could be
viewed as an effort to fulfill this weakness.
In addition, these activities also have the purpose of
taking advantage of Vietnam's cheap labor cost. At the
current rate of exchange, labor cost in Vietnam is only about
92half that of Singapore and about four-fifths that of Korea.
Moreover, along with the fact that Vietnamese armed forces
have been a huge training school whose "graduates," the
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demobilized soldiers, will be able to adapt themselves more
readily to the industrial sector; it is also believed that
some 300,000 Vietnamese have received some skills training -
mechanical, secretarial, professional - as a result of their
on-the-job training received in working for U.S. contractors
93
and U.S. or other free world government agencies. In brief,
an abundant supply of industrious and low-cost work force is
ready for the manufacturing sector's employment.
However, due to the problem of economies of scale and
the technological quality, the near future export prospects
for Vietnamese industrial products are not as favorable as
they are usually believed, except in some industries des-
cribed below.
Manufactured food products industry is ranked among the
most promising export industries. Even though economies
of scale are very important in the fruit and vegetable
canning, Vietnam is believed to be successvul in competition
on the overseas markets - mostly Singapore, Hong Kong, and
probably the United States and Japan - to supply those com-
94
modifies, owing to the cheap raw materials.
Wood products industry is also a good field for post war
export activities. As previously mentioned, the wood pro-
ducts sector is one of real potential growth because of the
abundance of raw materials, both coniferous and hardwoods.
Modern mills of economic size are required, and exports could
augment domestic markets and help to establish low cost
industries at an earlier date than domestic sales alone would
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allow. Plywood, which developed rapidly in sharing export
earnings in both Taiwan and South Korea during the last
95decade, gives a bright prospect for Vietnamese exports.
For paper and paper products, it is concluded that economi-
cally sized pulp and newsprint units must produce a minimum
of 100,000 tons per year, and 200,000 tons per year would be
a better target if an efficient export trade is to be
achieved.
Pharmaceuticals, which have grown rapidly during recent
years, may also present Vietnam with a bright export prospect,
Moreover, if efficient wage costs can be kept low - relative
to other neighboring countries - Vietnam may be able to
emulate the experience of South Korea and engage in subcon-
tracting, which is the practice of importing a raw or semi-
finished product, processing it one stage further, and
reexporting for final fabrication. The creation of export
processing zones and free tariff ports is certain to promote
these activities. Japanese industry has entered such arrange-
ments because of rising wage costs in Japan, and the rapid
97increases in wages in neighboring countries can help
Vietnam to compete successfully with these countries in such
activities
.
It is worth noting that, in addition to the country's
abundant natural resources and its low cost-labor force,
there are a vast war-inherited infrastructure and a host of
other assets. A genuine cease fire would permit the conver-





There are other possibilities of export earnings in
activities or commod-ties whose future is more speculative.
Three of these will be considered briefly: petroleum, other
raw materials, and tourism.
It is strongly believed that the discovery of Vietnamese
petroleum is going to change the whole economy of this country.
In fact, the oil dream of the Vietnamese started over a decade
ago with seismic survey off the southeast coast of Vietnam,
conducted by the Committee for Coordination of Joint Pros-
pecting for Mineral resources in Asian offshore areas (CCOP)
.
With equipment and technical personnel provided by Great
Britain, the study concentrated on an area in the vicinity of
Panjang Island. This survey concluded that there was a
sedimentary layer up to three miles thick between the west
coast of Vietnam and Panjang. This initial study was soon
followed by a regional sparker survey, which was carried out
by CCOP and covered 10,000 line miles in the Gulf of Siam
and the South China Sea, which aided in defining several basin
areas as well as showing the presence of thick sedimentary
sections and favorable structural developments in the offshore
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area. During 1969-70, further seismic surveys off the
•eastern and southern coast were conducted, and in order to
regulate the oil concessions, as well_ as the oil explorations
in the future, the Petroleum Law - law No. 011/70 - was




The oil prospects of Vietnam have become, indeed, really
promising since July 19 73, when four oil firms out of 15,
won the bid of exploration rights to eight offshore conces-
sions of some 7000 square miles each. Upon signing the
contracts awarding the above-mentioned concessions, the
government expected to receive a composite signature bonus
of 16.6 million dollars. Furthermore, the oil firms are
planning to spend 60 million dollars on exploration within
the next five years, mostly for the services provided by the
Vietnamese.
However, these amounts of foreign exchange earnings were
expected for only the very first phase of the oil yield in
Vietnam. The concession contracts also specified that as
soon as oil is found in commercially explorable quantity, the
petroleum companies must pay in a lump sum of 10 million
dollars. Then, due to the Petroleum Law, royalties equiva-
lent to 12.5 per cent of production must be paid, and cor-
porate income tax applied to oil producing firms of 55 per
. 101
cent.
Obviously, such incomes will take time, but even a
modest commercial discovery could dramatically change the
export picture in Vietnam.
In addition to that, in the future, Vietnam may have
export opportunities in other raw materials, principally
metallic and non-metallic minerals. Although little study
has been made on the mineral resources of the country, the
general geological structure and age appears favorable for
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102the existence of a range of minerals. Kaolins and clays
represent one product family that may exist in deposits;
nonferrous are another possibility. Furthermore, recent
studies showed that many natural sources of mineral water
exist throughout the country. Many springs are known to
provide mineral water of high therapeutic value which
promises a very good export prospect. However, generally
speaking, until systematic geological exploration, mapping,
and analysis are undertaken, particularly in the highlands,
the potential mineral resources of the country cannot be
assessed.
Finally, there are very real possibilities in tourism.
Situated right on one of the most heavily travelled tourist
routes, Vietnam has a number of physical attractions that,
in any other country, would provide a base for tourism.
These include a number of beach areas, big game hunting, and
cool highland areas, all within a short distance from
Saigon, its capital. It is also believed that the war has
given Vietnam publicity that would be helpful to tourism
industry of this country. In brief, when peace comes, the
tourist sector will no doubt be one of foremost importances
because it can be developed quickly and can perhaps earn more
foreign exchange than any single export item.
In summary, for a future projection of Vietnamese export
prospects, it is true, to be sure, that when the war ends,
the agricultural sector will continue to be the leading one,
in which - besides the traditional leading goods: rice and
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natural rubber - fisheries products and wood products are
going to be the most promising exports. For the export
markets, Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore are still the main
overseas markets of Vietnamese goods. Apart from those,
the United States, France, West Germany, and the United
Kingdom continue to present Vietnam with many opportunities
to export. In addition to the traditional activities,
petroleum and tourism are the most promising possibilities
to improve the foreign trade of this country.
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VI. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The analysis mentioned in previous chapters clearly proves
that exports might accomplish their role in guiding the Viet-
namese economy to a viable condition. Apart from the abun-
dance of resources, including the relatively low-cost and
well-trained labor force, the new export programs have
provided a convenient climate for export activities. Yet,
the process of export expansion is certainly not an easy and
simple one. It is true that the temporary good will of the
government and a large amount of resources are only the neces-
sary, but not sufficient, conditions to drive exports.
Several other internal and external factors have strongly
affected and will continue to affect export performance. In
other words, the success of Vietnamese exports relies upon
numerous aspects, of which some vital ones are mentioned
below.
A. CHANGING THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURES
As mentioned, during the wartime, the Vietnamese econo-
mic structures have been distorted in the sense that the
war favored in particular economic activities in import
business and in the supply of goods and services to allied
troops and foreign civilian personnel. It explained the
concentration of wealth in these sectors. The withdrawal of
foreign forces and the concomitant reduction of U.S. expendi-
tures in Vietnam changed the economic climate but the former
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tendency still has heavy influence on Vietnamese businessmen.
Consequently, in that environment, production activities were
not appreciated as they needed to be.
Changing economic structures, therefore, is necessary as
the primary condition to drive export. New strategies must
be required to manipulated costs and rewards in such a way
as to direct energies and initiatives of the private sector
into more productive channels. In addition to the recent
reforms in investment conditions and in the monetary sector,
other strong measures have to be enacted in other areas , such
as finance and imports . These actions could harm the govern-
ment credit and the government has to trade off between costs
and benefits of these measures. If economic viability is
the ultimate goal of the nation, the government ought to
consider balancing it with other objectives, such as military
and political.
B. CAPITAL AND CREDIT
It is obvious that capital investment and credit are
needed to produce commodities for export in any country, and
Vietnam is no exception. It is also true that most heavy
private investment is needed for the development of industry
leading to the production of manufactured goods, but the
exploitation and development of the country's agriculture,
forestry, and fishery's potentials also require substantial
capital. Apart from investment in the production plant
itself, capital will be needed to finance the export opera-
tion. Moreover, with increasing competition among exporting
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countries , exporters have to give credit to foreign buyers
.
Even though the new investment law which gives many privi-
leges and assurances to foreigners, was applied two years ago,
it did not have enough power to attract the foreign capital
,
owing to the risk in war time. The domestic capital should,
therefore be viewed as the main financing required to produce
and market the commodities that Vietnam hopes to export.
In doing so, it appears that the Government will have to
take the lead in making greatly expanded credit available to
producers and traders. One alternative is to set up the
Export Development Bank, a separate body from Export Develop-
ment Center, to efficiently finance exports. Again, cost-
benefit analysis is necessary to determine how much capital
resources should be withdrawn from other government sectors
to devote to exports. At the same time, in order to
encourage commercial banks to fund out shipments , some forms
of public assurance for the credit extended by its exporters
to their customers, as applied in some neighboring countries,
particularly in Hong Kong through the Export Insurance Cor-
poration, appeared to be very successful.
C. PROCEDURES
It is likely that, in many developing countries, the
formalities and red tape involved in the conduct of foreign
trade have been, in practice, the most difficult problem of
export expansion. For instance, in 1964, the South Korean
exporter was required to take 37 separate procedures, involv-
ing the presentation of 94 different forms, and a total of
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1948 copies, for a single shipment of cotton textiles; from
84 to 121 man/days of work were necessary for this process.
In Vietnam, prior to 1971, in order to control strictly
the foreign exchange earned by exporters, heavy procedures
were applied on foreign trade. After the issuing of the new
program, procedural requirements concerning exports and the
travel required to promote exports were relatively relaxed.
However, if the decision is still left to each agency, it is
probable that very little will ever be done to eliminate some
of the clearance requirements and to relax some of the others.
At least, it is necessary to assemble representatives of all
the agencies involved in clearing exports in one location,
to save a trader the time he spends in going, and in waiting,
from one office to another. In addition, careful control
should be paid to the procedure to prevent the corruption of
some executives, who usually complicate the administrative
procedures by themselves to obtain the illegal profit!
D. TRADE ORGANIZATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS
Trade organizations are useful as channels for dissemin-
ating information, for sounding out opinion, and for exert-
ing a certain amount of pressure to maintain an acceptable
level of ethics. They are also a convenient means of
providing certain essential services to traders, for example,
price reports, trade news, commodity inspection, and infor-
mation or procedures. Therefore, in any export program,
there is clearly a place for the quasi-public or private
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trade associations, such as chambers of commerce, boards of
trade, or exporter associations.
In Vietnam, apart from the Saigon Chamber of Commerce,
the principal spokesman for export business, there exist
some trade associations, founded on particular commodities,
but they were generally weak. The reason for this was that
Vietnamese traders were substantially removed from the
main stream of international trade for several years, and
in addition, most of the exporting firms are relatively small
in both resources and volume of business.
In the current climate of export promotion, there was a
particular need in Vietnam for exporters to join trade
associations. In the beginning, this might be preferable to
numerous individual commodity associations because the number
of traders is relatively small. Overtime, however, it is
expected that traders will also organize on commodity lines,
as they have done in most countries.
Trade organizations also serve useful purposes in
presenting a semblance of unity in dealing with prospective
buyers or exploiting potential markets. In fact, with the
possible exception of rubber and rice exporters, Vietnam's
traders have never been particularly strong or well-
organized, in the sense of presenting a united front in
dealings with overseas buyers. Along with -the helpful role
of trade organizations in negotiations, Vietnam may find it
both necessary and expedient to engage in government-to-
government negotiations, in order to pave the way for
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increased exports to offset the heavy flow of imports. This
type of negotiation is particularly appropriate in trading
with countries that have been heavy suppliers of goods to
Vietnam in recent years.
E. SPECIAL SERVICES
As trade develops, transportation and shipping services
become very important. Freight rates and frequency of ship-
ment, and even adequacy of service are essential elements
which determine the success or the failure of commodities
on overseas markets. Consequently, there is a need for an
organization of some sort to represent the interests of the
public and traders in such matters, and at least at the
start, only the government can provide or finance these
services
.
The need for mediation and arbitration to resolve the
disputes that inevitably arise between buyers and sellers
will also increase along with increasing trade flows.
Services of this sort can be provided by a government agency,
but in practice, they are often delegated to a quasi-public
organization, such as a Chamber of Commerce or a board of
trade.
The experiences of neighboring countries, particularly
of South Korea, proved that export-oriented technical
assistance from external public or private sources was a
105
most valuable support to the export promotion effort.
Vietnam has certainly needed such an assistance, which can
be_ ranked from the structurally planning level to lower
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ones, including guidance in techniques of processing and
marketing.
Other special services relating to the market research
and information, to merchandising techniques, etc., also
become essential elements in a keenly competitive world, and
they should be paid more attention, as trade develops.
F. THE WAR
The.most difficult problem for the export expansion in
Vietnam is obviously the instability in the military and
political situation of the country, owing to the war. As
noted, the hostility eliminated not only the production
capacity of resources, but also the capital investment from
both domestic and external sources. It is true, to be sure,
that the level of export activities was highly correlated,
in the inverse direction, to the rate of fighting around the
country. Consequently, the same relationship existed between
export trade and the political situation. The bright pros-
pects of exports from Vietnam, described in the previous
chapter, were mostly projected from the standpoint of a
peaceful environment. With this assumption, all resources
- both material and human - are preserved to the production,
instead of to the war effort as they have been. Lessons of
the past proved that all efforts devoted to production - part
of it might be oriented to exports - could become useless if
the fighting suddenly increases its rate. This was the case
of the TET offensive's destruction on the "green revolution"
,
, n , 106in early 1968.
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The current increasing fighting around the country
implied that the opposing military forces continued to
swallow up a large part of the resources and the energies
necessary for rebuilding the country. In that context,
expectations of "promising prospects" for Vietnamese exports
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